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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR, 
Defendant/ Appellant 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Case No. 990753CA 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant 
to Rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure because 
the sentencing of Mr. Taylor, entered on August 25, 1999 is 
considered the final decision of the District Court. See 
also Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2)(e). 
The Notice of Appeal was filed on August 31, 1999, 
within 3 0 days of the entry of judgment. Thus, pursuant to 
Rule 4(e) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this 
appeal is timely. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issues presented for appeal are as follows: 
1. Whether Trooper Salas exceeded the scope of the 
traffic stop by further detaining and questioning the 
Defendant Mr. Taylor. 
2. Whether Mr. Taylor's consent to search was invalid 
because it was obtained by exploitation of a prior 
illegality and was not voluntary. 
This Court reviews the factual findings underlying the 
trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress 
under a clearly erroneous standard. See State v. Troyer. 
910 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah 1995). The legal determinations 
regarding reasonable suspicion made by the trial court are 
reviewed "for correctness according no deference to the 
trial court's conclusions." State v. Yates. 918 P. 2d 13 6, 
138 (Utah 1996); See also. State v. Patefield. 927 P.2d 655 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
A. UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated . 
U.S. Cons t. Amend. IV 
B. UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches 
and seizures, shall not be violated. 
Utah Constitution, Art. I, sec. 14 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
Mr. Taylor appeals from his conviction following the 
entry of his conditional plea of guilty to the Information 
charging him with Possession of a Controlled Substance 
(Marijuana) with Intent to Distribute, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code §58-37-8 (1998) • 
Specifically, Mr. Taylor challenges the Trial court's denial 
of his Motion to Suppress Evidence. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
1. On April 12, 1998, Mr. Taylor was charged in an 
Information with Possession of a Controlled Substance with 
Intent to Distribute, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code §58-37-8 (1998) . 
2. Mr. Taylor filed a Motion to Suppress. A copy of 
that motion is attached. (See Addendum A) . 
3. On June 16, 1999, a Suppression Hearing was held. 
4. On July 7, the Motion to Suppress was denied. A 
copy of the Trial Court's Ruling on Motion to Suppress is 
attached (See Addendum B) . On that same day, Mr. Taylor 
pled guilty as charged, but preserved his right to appeal 
from the Motion to Suppress. 
C. DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Mr. Taylor was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for a 
term of not more than five (5) years on August 25, 1999. 
The Notice of Appeal was timely filed on August 31, 1999. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On April 12, 1999, the defendant, Eric Taylor 
("Taylor") was traveling on 1-70 in Grand County, Utah. 
(Suppression Hearing ["S.H."] 3). He was driving a red 1999 
Pontiac Grand Am rental car with a Nevada license plate. 
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(S.H. 3). Taylor, a black male born in the U.S. Virgin 
Islands, was pulled over by Utah Highway Patrol Trooper 
Steve Salas ("Trooper Salas") purportedly for having "no 
front [license] plate." (S.H. 4, 11). 
Trooper Salas approached the vehicle and as the window 
was rolled down, he noticed an odor of "perfume or an air 
freshener" coming from the vehicle. (S.H. 4) . Trooper Salas 
explained that the stop was because there was no front plate 
on the vehicle. Mr. Taylor then asked to inspect the front 
of the vehicle and did so. (S.H. 4) . Mr. Taylor then 
returned to the vehicle and Salas asked for his driver's 
license, registration, and insurance. Mr. Taylor provided 
these items as well as the rental agreement from the rental 
car company. (S.H. 5). Mr. Taylor, a resident of 
Massachusetts, had a valid Massachusetts driver's license. 
(S.H. 5). 
Trooper Salas then proceeded to ask Mr. Taylor what he 
was doing in Nevada. (S.H. 5). When Mr. Taylor responded 
that he was on business selling computers, Officer Salas 
continued the questioning by asking what type of computers 
he sold. (S.H. 5). Trooper Salas then returned to his car 
and ran driver's license and warrant checks, which came back 
clean. (S.H. 5). Trooper Salas wrote Taylor a warning for 
having no front license. (S.H. 5-6). 
Trooper Salas continued his questioning. He asked Mr. 
Taylor why the car wasn't in the company name if he was on 
business. He asked Mr. Taylor why he didn't fly from 
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Massachusetts rather than drive. He asked Mr. Taylor how 
many computers he sold while he was in Las Vegas. (S.H. 6) 
Trooper Salas then suggested to Mr. Taylor that someone 
had called him and informed him that Mr. Taylor was 
transporting drugs. (S.H. 7). Trooper Salas asked for 
consent to search the vehicle, which Mr. Taylor granted. 
(S.H. 7). While searching in a black bag in the trunk of the 
vehicle, Trooper Salas found a package wrapped in gift wrap. 
(S.H. 8). Th$ package contained approximately nine pounds of 
marijuana. (S.H. 8). 
Mr. Taylor was then taken into custody. (S.H. 9). The 
suspected marijuana was logged into evidence and detected in 
the state crime lab. (S.H. 9). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The tri^ .1 court erred in denying Mr. Taylor's Motion to 
Suppress because Trooper Salas exceeded the scope of the 
stop by relentlessly questioning Mr. Taylor on matters 
completely unrelated to the minor traffic violation for 
which he was stopped. Trooper Salas!s questions exceeded 
the scope of the traffic stop and were not supported by a 
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. 
Chapman, 921 p.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995) (stating that once 
driver has produced valid driver's license and evidence of 
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed without being subjected to delay by police for 
additional questioning) (quoting State v. Lopez, 873 P. 2d 
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1127, 1132 (Utah 1994)). Because Trooper Salas exceeded the 
scope of the stop, all evidence obtained from it must be 
suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 
488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
While Mr. Taylor eventually consented to the search, he 
did so in the course of an illegal seizure. Therefore, Mr. 
Taylor1s consent is invalid and the subsequent search was 
illegal. All evidence obtained from the search must be 
suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United States. 371 U.S. 471, 
488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
Mr. Taylor filed a Motion to Suppress the evidence 
obtained from the illegal seizure and subsequent search 
claiming that Mr. Taylor's rights were violated under the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and 
Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah. A 
hearing was held and an order entered by the Court on July 
7, 1999, which set forth the following: 
This Court believes it was reasonable for the 
officer to suspect something amiss under these 
circumstances [in that the driver was not from 
Nevada and had rented the car in Nevada; that the 
driver said he sold Microsoft computers, but 
Microsoft doesn't make computers; that there were 
white velvet bags on the front mirror and the rear 
dash; and that there was a strong fragrance of 
perfume or air freshener]. Accordingly, the 
officer was entitled to delay the driver to ask a 
few more questions. The answers to those 
questions did not allay the suspicion, but 
heightened it slightly. The officer then 
appropriately asked for consent to search, which 
he received. 
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The Court denied Mr. Taylor1s Motion to Suppress the 
evidence based upon these findings and it is from this 
decision that Mr. Taylor appeals. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TROOPER UNLAWFULLY EXCEEDED THE 
SCOPE OF THE STOP 
Trooper Salas exceeded the scope of the stop by 
questioning Mr. Taylor on matters unrelated to the traffic 
violation and unsupported by a reasonable suspicion of 
criminal activity. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the "right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures." U.S. Const. Amend IV. The courts 
have held that "although a person has a lesser expectation 
of privacy in a car than in his or her home, one does not 
lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in an 
automobile." State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 
1994) (quoting State v. Schlosser. 774 P.222d 1132, 1135 
(Utah 1989)). The test for whether a search or seizure is 
constitutionally reasonable is twofold: (1) was the police 
officer's action justified at its inception? and (2) was the 
resulting detention reasonably related in scope to the 
circumstances that justified the interference in the first 
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place? See State v. Shepard. 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1998). 
As part of this inquiry, the courts have found that 
when an officer stops a vehicle, "the detention must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate 
the purpose of the stop." Id. Also, "once the driver has 
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of 
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay 
by police for additional questioning." State v. Lopez, 873 
P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)); See also State v. 
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 452 (Utah 1995). 
This is precisely what went unconstitutionally wrong in 
this case. Taylor was stopped on a very minor traffic 
violation, no front plate. (S.H. 4). He produced a valid 
driver's license and a rental agreement showing his 
entitlement to the vehicle. A warrants and license check 
came back clean. (S.H. 5). He was given a warning for 
having no front plate on his vehicle, the purported purpose 
of the stop. (S.H. 5) . At this point, Taylor should have 
been allowed to proceed, "without being subjected to further 
delay by police for additional questioning." Lopez at 113 7. 
See also State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 1995) 
(stating that upon receiving a negative response to a 
warrants check, the officers were required to either arrest 
the defendant, issue him a citation, or release him) . 
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However, Taylor was subjected to additional 
questioning. Salas asked additional questions unrelated to 
the stop such as why the rental car wasn't in a company 
name, and why Taylor drove rather than flew from 
Massachusetts. (S.H. 6). The answers Taylor gave to these 
questions may have been somewhat inconsistent, however, this 
questioning was not constitutionally acceptable in the first 
place and should not have even been asked. Based on these 
few questions and inconsistent answers, Trooper Salas asked 
Mr. Taylor "if there would be any reason why someone would 
call me and inform me that he [Mr. Taylor] was transporting 
drugs." (S.H. 7). Trooper Salas then asked permission to 
search the vehicle and the discovery of the drugs ensued. 
(S.H. 7) 
The State may argue that questions asked by Salas were 
proper investigative questions. However, "further detention 
for investigative questioning ^must be supported by 
reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity.1" 
State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990)). This suspicion must be "based on specific, 
articulable facts drawn from the totality of the 
circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop." 
Id. 
The Trial Court agreed that the "conversation after 
checking the driver's license was not routine and would be 
permitted only if information gathered to that point gave 
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rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 
(Ruling on Motion to Suppress: 1-2). The Trial Court found 
that the officer knew four things at this point: 1) that the 
driver was not from Nevada and had rented the car in Nevada; 
2) the driver said he sold Microsoft computer and Microsoft 
does not make computers; 3) there were white bags on the 
front mirror and rear dash; and 4) there was a strong 
fragrance of perfume or air freshener. (Ruling on Motion to 
Suppress: 2). The Trial Court found that this was enough to 
create an objectively reasonable suspicion; Taylor 
disagrees. 
In State v. Shepard, 955 P.2d 352 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), 
the defendants were pulled over for speeding. They were 
unable to produce a registration card or other paperwork to 
establish ownership of the car. A check on the license 
plate reported that the plate number was not on file. 
Furthermore, the defendant initially gave the officer a 
receipt for work done on the car with someone's name on it 
other than defendant's. The officer was given a handwritten 
card with only a vehicle identification number on it. The 
officer then wanted to compare the VIN on the card with the 
actual VIN in the car. While doing this, the officer saw, 
in plain view, a corncob pipe which smelled of marijuana. 
The officer then searched the vehicle and found marijuana 
and other drugs. 
The court found that the officer's conduct in Shepard 
was supported by an objectively reasonable suspicion. The 
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officer had a reasonable suspicion that the car was stolen 
because the defendant produced a repair receipt with someone 
else's name on it. The defendant also produced a suspicious 
temporary registration card with only a VIN on it. This 
justified the officer in comparing the VIN on the card with 
the VIN in the vehicle. The officer then saw the corncob 
pipe in plain view and smelled marijuana, which justified 
his further search of the vehicle. 
Officer Salas in the present case had no such 
"reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 
In Shepard, the defendant failed to produce evidence of 
entitlement to the car. Here, Taylor produced a valid 
rental agreement proving his entitlement to the car as well 
as a valid driver's license. In Shepard, the officer saw a 
corncob pipe which smelled of marijuana. In this case, the 
officer saw no such incriminating evidence. The fact that 
Taylor was not from Nevada and he had rented the vehicle in 
Nevada is not suspicious as business and personal travelers 
often rent vehicles at their destination. 
Salas apparently relied upon the smell of "perfume or 
an air freshener" (S.H. 4) to suspect further criminal 
activity. Rental cars often have such a smell as do many 
other cars. Furthermore, in United States v. Gonzalez, 763 
F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1985), the officer noticed an "extremely 
strong odor of some kind of deodorizer." Id. at 1127. The 
defendant was pulled over in New Mexico and gave the officer 
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a New York driver's license and a California car title 
document. In response to the officer's questions, the 
defendant stated he was going to Albuquerque to give the car 
to the owner. The defendant, however, could not give the 
name of the car's owner. In holding that this was an 
illegal search and seizure, the court stated that the 
officer was "unable to articulate particular facts - other 
than the deodorizer smell and the unusual combination of 
automobile license, registration, and title documents--" 
that would justify a reasonable suspicion to detain and 
search defendant's vehicle. See id. at 1128-29. 
Salas also apparently relied on some inconsistent or 
"odd" answers Mr. Taylor gave to some of Salas' s questions. 
However, in Gonzales, the fact that the defendant gave odd 
answers, i.e. did not know the name of the car's owner, did 
not justify the officer in searching the vehicle. Likewise 
in this case, Mr. Taylor's responses to Trooper Salas's 
questions do not give rise to a reasonable suspicion 
justifying a search. This is particularly true in this case 
because many of Trooper Salas's questions should not have 
even been asked in the first place. 
Salas also apparently relied on the pager attached to 
Taylor's belt to suspect illegal activity. (S.H. 6). 
Trooper Salas also found it important to note that he saw 
some small velvet bags on the dash of Mr. Taylor's vehicle 
(S.H. 4). These items, in themselves, do not denote 
criminal activity. The case law on point require much more 
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to create a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity 
involving contraband. See State v. Shepard (a corncob pipe 
smelling of marijuana justified search); State v. Earl, 716 
P.2d 803 (Utah 1986) (a loaded firearm, a quantity of 
controlled substances and drug paraphernalia gave officer 
cause to believe additional contraband might be located in 
the vehicle). In the present case, Trooper Salas seemed to 
rely on a profile to suspect drug activity: a black male 
with an Island accent driving a shiny red new car and 
wearing a pager. Based on this profile, Trooper Salas 
followed a hunch, which later turned out to be correct, that 
Mr. Taylor was transporting drugs. However, as the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated, a hunch, without more, does not 
raise a reasonable articulable suspicion regardless of the 
final result. See State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 764 (Utah 
1991) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968)). 
After getting Taylor's driver's license and rental 
agreement, Salas began questioning Taylor as to what he was 
doing in Nevada. (S.H. 5) . Salas had evidence of Taylor's 
right to drive and to possess the vehicle, so his questions 
amounted to a fishing expedition based on the smell of an 
air freshener, a pager, and perhaps Taylor's race. The 
questions were inappropriate as "once the driver has 
produced a valid driver's license and evidence of 
entitlement to use the vehicle, he must be allowed to 
proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay 
by police for additional questioning." State v. Lopez, 873 
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P.2d 1127, 1137 (Utah 1994) (quoting State v. Robinson. 797 
P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)). 
The seizure of Mr. Taylor was unreasonable under 
Article 1, Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. All 
evidence seized as the fruit of the unlawful continued 
detention must be suppressed. See Wong Sun v. United 
States. 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 9L.Ed.2d 
441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 (Utah 1991). 
POINT II. MR. TAYLORS CONSENT TO SEARCH THE VEHICLE WAS 
INVALID BECAUSE IT WAS OBTAINED AS THE RESULT OF AN ILLEGAL 
DETENTION 
Mr. Taylor gave his consent to Trooper Salas to search 
the vehicle while he was being illegally detained. To show 
the consent was lawfully obtained, the State must show it 
was (1) voluntary, and (2) not obtained by exploitation of 
the prior illegality. See State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684, 
688 (Utah 1990). 
In determining whether the evidence was obtained by 
exploitation of the prior illegality, the courts look at 
whether the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the 
illegal seizure. The factors to be considered in an 
exploitation analysis include temporal proximity of the 
illegality and the consent, the presence of intervening 
circumstances, and the purpose and flagrancy of the official 
misconduct. See id. at 690-91 n.4. 
In the present case, the consent was obtained at a time 
when the officer should have allowed Mr. Taylor to proceed 
on his way without further delay. At the time Mr. Taylor 
consented to the search, the purposes of the stop had been 
completed. Trooper Salas had verified Mr. Taylor's right to 
drive and right to possession of the vehicle and had issued 
a warning for having no front plate. (S.H. 5) . Even though 
Trooper Salas had returned Mr. Taylor's license and other 
belongings at this point, Mr. Taylor did not reasonably 
believe he was free to go. At no point did Trooper Salas 
tell Mr. Taylor that he was free to go. In fact, Trooper 
Salas continued to question Mr. Taylor, and it was during 
the course of this detention that Mr. Taylor gave his 
consent to search the vehicle. (S.H. 7). 
In State v. Godina-Luna, 826 P.2d 652 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992), the defendant was pulled over for drifting between 
lanes. The driver was unable to produce a driver's license 
and neither occupant was the registered owner of the 
vehicle. Because the defendant was behaving nervously, the 
officer asked him if they had any alcohol, firearms, or 
drugs in the vehicle. Orozco, the driver of the car, 
believed that the fact he was Mexican and did not have a 
driver's license meant the officer would search the car 
whether he granted permission or not. As a result, Orozco 
gave consent for the vehicle to be searched. In finding the 
consent to be the result of an illegal detention, the court 
found that the "consent occurred during an ongoing illegal 
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seizure, thus no time factor separated the illegality from 
the consent." Id. 
The present case is similar in that Mr. Taylor, a black 
man, was being detained and questioned by Trooper Salas. 
Trooper Salas claims to have returned Mr. Taylor's documents 
to him before the consent to search was given. Even if he 
actually did return them, Mr. Taylor was never told he was 
free to go and never reasonably believed he could go. (S.H. 
6-7). The detention continued, and this is when the consent 
was given. 
Mr. Taylor's consent was invalid under Article 1, 
Section 14 of the Utah State Constitution and the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution. Accordingly, 
evidence seized as the fruit of the invalid consent and 
unlawful continued detention must be suppressed. Wong Sun 
v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488, 833 S.Ct. 407, 417-18, 
9L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 786 
(Utah 1991). 
CONCLUSION 
While Taylor's answers to some of Salas's questions may 
have been strange or inconsistent, Taylor should not have 
even been asked these questions in the first place. Even if 
Trooper Salas was justified in asking these questions, the 
answers did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of 
further drug activity. The original purpose of the stop, 
the lack of a front license plate, could have been quickly 
determined and resolved without such questioning. However, 
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Trooper Salas continued with his questioning, even after the 
purpose of the stop was completed. Furthermore, because Mr. 
Taylor was unlawfully detained when he consented to a search 
of his vehicle, his consent is invalid. 
Based on the foregoing, Taylor respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the Trial Court's ruling denying the 
Motion to Suppress. 
DATED this 14th day of December, 1999. 
(f/A-
Happy<f\ Morgan 
Grand County Public Defender 
Attorney for Defendant, Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 14th day of December, 
1999, I sent by first-class mail, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the above BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the 
following: 
Office of the Attorney General, Appellate Division 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0854 
Law Office of Happy Morgan 
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Addendum ~A~ 
Happy Morgan, #7586 
Attorney at Law 
8 S. 100 E. 
Moab,UT 84532 
(435)259*9418 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
Eric Samuel Taylor, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
REQUEST FOR HEARING 
CASE NO. 9917-34 
COMES NOW the Defendant hereto by and through his attorney of record, Happy 
Morgan, and herewith moves this Court for an Order suppressing any evidence obtained 
in violation of his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution of Utah 
L DATED this M day of June, 1999. 
lorga 
for Defendant. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on June 7
 % 1999,1 Faxed / mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Motion to Suppress; Request for Hearing to the 
following: 
William L. Benge 
Grand County Attorney
 y * 
Law Office of Happy Morgan 
Addendum ~B~ 
•';S:VENTH DISTINCT couar 
Grand Couojy 
THE SEVENTH DISTRICT JUDICIAL COURT IN AND FOR GRAND COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OP UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
ve 
ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
Defendant. 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
Case No. 9917-34 
Judge Lyle R, Anderson 
The critical question in this case is whether the police 
officer violated defendants' rights by inquiring about 
defendant's travel plans. There is case authority supporting the 
proposition that the police may not expand the scope of a stop 
without reasonable suspicion of further criminal activity. It 
also seems tc be accepted in otner cases that the police do not 
violate an individuals rights by engaging in routine 
conversation. 
From the evidence presented in this case, it appears that 
the officer gained some information before checking che drivers 
license. This information was gained in the course of routine 
friendly conversation between the driver and the officer, which 
the law does not prohibit. The conversation after checking the 
1 
THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
CASE NUMBER 9917-34 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
driver's license was not routine and would be permitted only if 
information gathered to that point gave rise to a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. At that point, the officer knew: 
1. The driver was not from Nevada and had rented the car 
in Nevada, 
2. The driver said he sold Microsoft computers. Microsoft 
does not manufacture computers 
3. There were white velvet bags on the frcnc mirror and 
the rear dash, 
4. There was a strong fragrance of perfume or air 
freshener. 
This court believes it was reasonable to suspect something 
amiss under these circumstances Accordingly, the officer was 
entitled to delay the driver tc ask a few more questions The 
answers to those questions did not allay the suspicion, but 
1
 Someone who actually sells computers could possibly answer this question in this 
way, meaning "computers that run on Microsoft software, as opposed to Apple." However, 
most salesmen would either name their manufacturer or say "TBM compatible". 
2 
THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
CASE NUMBER 9917-34 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
he igh tened i t s l i g h t l y . The o f f i c e r then a p p r o p r i a t e l y asked for 
consent t o s e a r c h , which he r ece ived . 
The motion t o suppress i s denied . 
3 
THE STATE OF UTAH vs ERIC SAMUEL TAYLOR 
CASE NUMBER 9917-34 
RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
COCTRT CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OP MAILING/HAND DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on tne day of July, 1999, I 
mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered, a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO SUPPRESS tc the 
following: 
William L. Benge 
County Attorney 
125 East Center 
Moab, Utah 6453 2 
Happy Morgan 
Public Defender 
8 South 100 East 
Moab, Uti 
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came into contact with the gift I noticed that it was--
Q A gift, what do you mean? 
A Well, it was packaged, it was in gift wrap at the 
bottom of the bag. I pulled it out. I wasn't--it didn't 
have square corners. It was firm. It wasn't solid. I 
6
 pulled it out. I asked him what it was. He said it was a 
7 gift for his wife or for his girlfriend, he said. And at 
8 that time I asked him if I could open it. He said to go 
9 ahead. I opened it up and it was packaged narcotics. 
Q Or what appeared to you--
A Would appear, right? 
Q What kind did it appear to be? 
A At the time I couldn't tell. The packaging was 
really thick. They were in square packages. I couldn't see 
any color. After I had taken the packages out of the bag 
1 5
 and put them on my vehicle I put Mr. Taylor in handcuffs and 
16 he told me it was marijuana. 
17 I Q Okay. How much marijuana did you ultimately find? 
A I think it was a little over nine pounds. 
Q How many separate packages? 
A Three separate packages. 
Q Did you weigh it yourself to determine the nine 
pounds? 
A No I did not. During the, after I had Mr. Taylor 
handcuffed he explained to me that it was nine pounds. He 
2 4
 said, because I had searched the vehicle after finding those 
25 three packages he said, "That is all there is. There's only 
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P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Eric Samuel Taylor, c?se 991700034. 
MR. BENGE: We're ready, Your Hon<:>r. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
STEVE SALAS, 
6 II having first been duly and legally sworn, was 
7 II examined and testified on his oath as follows: 
8 ii DIRECT EXAMINATION 
9 I py MR. BENGE: 
10 Q Tell us your name, please. 
11 A Steve Salas. 
1 2 Q How are you employed? 
A Utah Highway Patrol. 
Q How long have you been employed there? 
2*. Yz. \»ill be Si y&dcz ii\ S-aly . 
Q Let me call your attention to the 12th of April of 
tftis year. Were you on duty? 
A Yes, I was. 
18 I  Q And on that day did you have an occasion to have 
19 || contact with the defendant, Mr. Taylor? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q What were the circumstances? 
A I stopped Mr. Taylor on 1-70, approximately at mile 
post 166. I came into contact with him on a traffic stop. 
Q What was he driving? 
A He was in a red Pontiac Grand Am, '99. 
Q, And did you notice anything out of the ordinary 
13 
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about the vehicle? 
A The reason for the stop was no front plate. I 
noticed he had Nevada plates. The rear plate was a Nevada 
plate. He didn't have a front plate on the vehicle. That was 
the reason for the stop. 
^ Q In your experience as a highway patrolman in an 
7 adjacent state, are you aware Nevada requires a front plate? 
8 A Yes, they do. 
n Q After stopping him, what happened? 
A I approached the vehicle. And as I was approaching 
the vehicle I noticed Mr. Taylor had like a white, probably a 
like a velvet bag on the bag dash. I came into contact with 
him. I noticed there was another one hanging from the front 
mirror. 
Q How big were these velvet bags? 
1 5
 A They were probably two inch by two inch. They were 
16 fairly small. 
17 I Q Okay. Like a sachet kind of a thing? 
A Right. As he rolled down the window I noticed a 
fragrance, strong odor coming from the vehicle, like a 
perfume or an air freshener, something of that sort. I 
explained the reason I stopped Mr. Taylor, it was for the 
front plate. He immediately wanted to get out of the 
vehicle and see the front plate. So he was welcomed to do 
that. We got out, looked at the front plate. He had 
2 4
 I  explained to me that it may have fallen off or somebody may 
25 have stolen the plate. 
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Q What happened next? 
A At that point he got back in the vehicle. I asked 
him to get back in the vehicle. I asked him for his 
driver's license, registration, and insurance. I noticed 
his driver's license was from Massachusetts so I asked him 
6
 if he had purchased the vehicle in Nevada. He explained to 
V me that he had rented the vehicle so I got his rental 
8 agreement from him, looked at it, all his documentation. I 
g asked him a few questions, asked him what he was doing in 
Nevada. He explained to me that he was there on business. 
I asked him what kind of business he was in. He told me he 
was in computer sales. I asked him what kind of computers 
did he sell and he told me Microsoft and stuff like that. I 
asked him a few other questions. 
Q Did the answer, Microsoft, to your question, 
-^ wasn't that what brand of computers do you sell, strike you 
16 as odd? 
17 I A When that was his response that struck me kind of 
funny since Microsoft isn't a computer, it's a software. I 
had to ask people that question before and they're detailed 
in the type of computers that they sell. They usually know 
what they sell. 
Q What happened next? 
A At that point I went back to my vehicle. I ran 
his driver's license and warrant checks through Price 
2 4
 I  dispatch. I wrote him out a warning for no front license 
25 plate. Nothing came back as far as warrants go. I went 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
• 6 -
back to the vehicle. I gave Mr. Taylor all his stuff back. 
I proceeded to ask him the same questions. I asked him 
where he stayed in Nevada and he gave me the same location. 
While I was in my vehicle I noticed that the rental car was 
in his name. It wasn't in a company name, which was kind of 
° odd since it was a business trip. 
7 I questioned him about that, asked him why it 
8 wasn't in the company name. He explained to me that it was, 
9 that he was going to purchase the vehicle, or rent the 
vehicle, and they were going to reimburse him when he got 
back. I asked him why he didn't fly down to Las Vegas from 
Massachusetts because of the distance and he explained to me 
that he liked to sightsee, which was kind of odd due to the 
fact that it was a business trip. 
I also asked him again, I asked him how many 
1 5
 computers he did sell while he was in Las Vegas. He 
16 explained to me that he didn't sell any computers. I made 
17 I the comment that that was a waste of a trip and he says, 
"Well, actually I was just there for a conference", which 
was becoming a little inconsistent from what I'd heard 
before. 
Q Did you notice at any time in your dealing with 
him if he had any electronic equipment on his person? 
A Yes, as he got out to examine the front plate I 
noticed that he did have a pager attached to his belt. 
2 4
 I  Q What else then happened? 
25 A After asking him several questions about his trip 
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I asked him how he got down through Las Vegas. He explained 
to me that he had rented a separate rental car as he went 
down to Las Vegas. I asked him why he didn' t keep the 
vehicle or why he wasn't in the same vehicle. He explained 
to me that once he arrived in Las Vegas he pretty much 
6
 traveled by public transportation and by foot. At that 
7 point I had asked him, after asking him those questions I 
8 asked him, and I'm going to refer to my report here, I asked 
g him if there would be any reason why someone would call me 
and inform me that he was transporting drugs. And he got a 
surprised look on his face and just said no repeatedly, 
shaking his head. 
Q What happened next? 
A At that time I asked for a consent to search. He 
granted me permission to search the vehicle. I pulled him 
1 5
 out of the vehicle, got him in front of the vehicle, 
16 searched him. He had a--I searched him for weapons just to 
17 I see if he had any weapons on him, put him about probably 15 
feet up in front of the vehicle where I could see him. I 
immediately went to the trunk of the vehicle, pulled, he had 
luggage, just a few bags, I believe a blanket and a pillow 
in the back, pulled them out. 
In a large black bag, as I was searching, and I 
noticed he had Levis and a jersey t-shirt. He didn't have 
any business clothes, (inaudible) he was wearing a tie. In 
that black bag that I was searching, I dug up under the 
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nine pounds." 
Q Did you have any further conversations with Mr. 
Taylor about this incident other than him telling you that 
it was marijuana and that it was only nine pounds? 
A After we had taken him into custody we took him 
° back to the office and we questioned him and we asked him a 
7 few questions, where he had bought it, who it was for. 
8 I Q Had you mirandized him at that point? 
A Yes, we had. 
Q Who all was present? 
A ~ Myself and Sergeant Mecham, Darrell Mecham. 
Q What was the nature of that conversation? 
A He explained to us that it. was personal use. It 
wasn't for distribution. It wasn't going anywhere. He said 
he just enjoyed smoking marijuana. 
1
^ Q Did he indicate--you said you asked him where he 
16 got it. 
17 I A He told us that he did buy it in California. We 
asked him to name, who he had bought it from. He said he 
just went down there, went out on the street and found 
somebody, found a buyer. 
Q What did you do with the suspected marijuana? 
A We logged it into evidence in our office. It was 
later detected in the state crime lab in Price. 
Q Who took it up there or how did it get up there? 
2 4
 I  A I took it myself. 
25 Q Did you get a report back from the crime lab? 
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A Yes, I did. 
Q I'll show you what's been marked as State's 
Exhibit No. 1. Is that the report that you received back 
from the crime lab? 
A Yes, it is. 
^ Q Is there some way that you can tie that in to the 
7 packages that you took from this defendant by case number or 
8 name or anything? 
9 A I could take it in by case number, also by 
description, description of the three plastic wrapped 
bundles. 
MS. MORGAN: No objection. 
THE STATE: Exhibit 1 is received. Is that all, 
Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: No, Your Honor. 
1 5
 I  Q BY MR. BENGE: Have you had any training and 
16 experience in drug interdictions? 
17 A I've had classes, yes. I've taken two separate 
-jo schools for drug interdictions. 
Q Based upon your training in drug interdiction does 
that quantity of that particular controlled substance 
indicate to you, independent of the defendant's own 
statements, whether or not it's for sole use or for 
distribution? 
A In my experience it would be for distribution. 
24 || MR. BENGE: That's all I have. 
25 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
• 11 
CROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MS. MORGAN; 
Q In what direction were you traveling when you 
first saw Mr. Taylor's automobile? 
A I was sitting as milepost 162 and he was traveling 
eastbound. 
Q So he was driving towards you? 
A Right, he drove towards me and went by me. 
Q And so when you first looked at the vehicle you 
noted at that point that it didn't have front plates? 
A Right. 
Q As part of your training have you been instructed 
that rental cars are more likely than other cars to be 
transporting drugs? 
A Not necessarily, no. 
Q So you don't have any specific, or any tendency to 
pull over a rental car rather than another car (inaudible)? 
A No, I wasn't even aware it was a rental car until 
the stop. 
Q And the fact that this was a new automobile, did 
that impact your decision in any way to pull it over that 
day? 
A No. 
Q Now, Mr. Taylor is black and I don't believe he's 
African American, I think he's Jamaican. Did that--
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible). 
MS. MORGAN: Pardon me? Virgin Islands. He was 
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from the Virgin Islands. But to me he appears black. 
Q BY MS. MORGAN: The fact that he has black skin, 
did that in any way lead you to believe that he was possibly 
transporting drugs in his car that day? 
A No. 
6
 Q And how about the fact that he has sort of a 
7 Jamaican West Indies accent? Did that in any way lead you 
8 I to believe that he was transporting drugs that day? 
A No, it did not. 
Q And the pager that you mentioned in your police 
report. I'm somewhat curious why that was noteworthy in 
your report. 
A That's just a minor indicator. I mean, pagers are 
used by everybody but also cell phones, pagers, some type of 
communication to seek your contact where you're coming and 
going. 
16 I  Q In your experience lots of people wear pagers and 
17 I  they're not all necessarily--
A Right. 
MS. MORGAN: I have no further questions for this 
witness, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: No, sir. 
THE COURT: Okay. You can step down. 
MR. BENGE: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
2 4
 II THE COURT: Ms. Morgan? 
25 MS. MORGAN: Your Honor, I'm not sure if we're 
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going forward right now on the preliminary hearing and the 
Motion to Suppress or if you're just seeking argument on 
whether or not a bind over is appropriate. 
THE COURT: Just the bind over. 
MS. MORGAN: Nothing then. 
6
 II THE COURT: From the evidence that has been 
7 presented here I find that there is probable cause to 
8 believe that the defendant committed the offense charged in 
9 the information and I order that he be held to answer to 
that charge in the district court. If he wants to take care 
of the plea right now then we can move ahead to the 
suppression question. 
MS. MORGAN: We would like to, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. Do you waive the reading 
of the information? 
1 5
 II MS. MORGAN: We do, Your Honor. 
16 THE COURT: Come forward, Mr. Tanner. Mr. Tanner, 
17 H you're charged in this information with the offense of 
possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, a third 
degree felony. How do you plead to that charge? 
MR. TAYLOR: Not guilty. 
THE COURT: The defendant pleads not guilty. That 
plea will be entered. Before I set a trial date I'll decide 
the Motion to Suppress. 
MS. MORGAN: Thank you. 
2 4
 I THE COURT: All right, do you wish to present 
25 additional evidence on the question of suppression, Mr. 
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Benge? 
MR. BENGE: No, Your Honor, it was my 
understanding we were going to use one hearing for both. 
THE COURT: Okay, any additional evidence, Ms. 
Morgan? 
6
 II MS. MORGAN: No, Your Honor. 
7 THE COURT: Okay, you have filed a Motion to 
8 Suppress which is now appropriate and will be considered. 
g Tell me why I should suppress the evidence based on the 
evidence that I've heard today. 
MS. MORGAN: We don't believe that the stopping of 
the vehicle was reasonable, however, when the officer began 
asking about his trip, where he was going and why he was 
going there, why he chose this mode of transportation, what 
he did for a living, that went beyond the scope of the 
1 5
 initial traffic search. And because of that we're asking 
16 that the Court suppress the evidence. 
17 I And I understand that the officer has testified 
that Mr. Taylor consented to search of the vehicle. And it 
would be our position that given the circumstances and what 
the officer knew at that time he had no reasonable 
articulable suspicion to even ask that question and so he 
should not have asked that question. Mr. Taylor should not 
have been in the position of having to answer that question. 
So based on the officer going beyond the scope of the 
2 4
 original traffic search and asking to search the vehicle 
25 when he didn't have a reasonable basis we're asking that the 
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Court suppress the evidence found in the vehicle that day. 
And all of Mr. Taylor's statements regarding that evidence. 
THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Benge? 
MR. BENGE: Your Honor, I believe that Counsel is 
correct in your statement that the standard is articulatable 
6
 suspicion. The officer, in order to detain beyond the 
7 original traffic stop, does have to have some articulatable 
8 suspicion. And in fact it is, the Courts have held that 
9 that must be or that that may be ascertained from the 
totality of the circumstances not from any one thing, but a 
totality of things. 
In this case we have this gentleman who was 
wearing a pager, even though the officer truthfully 
indicates a lot of people do, he indicates that is an item 
that he looks at. He talked to this person, the individual, 
1 5
 about his business. The person said he sold computers. 
16 When asked what kind he said Microsoft. Which again, to 
17 him, was an odd thing with Microsoft being software not a 
-jo computer. He asked him about why he didn't fly to Las 
Vegas. He stated that he liked to drive and see the country 
but didn't give a very good explanation of why he would have 
rented one car and drive from Massachusetts to Las Vegas one 
way and then rent another car to drive from Las Vegas back 
to Massachusetts. 
The same thing with the rental car not being in 
2 4
 I  his company's name. All of those items, Your Honor, add up 
25 to not necessarily a probable cause but this isn't a 
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probable cause hearing. They add up to an articulatable 
suspicion on this officer's part not to search but to ask if 
he could search. And he did ask. He was granted consent. 
And this minor intrusion was justified based on the 
articulatable suspicion to get to the point of the asking 
6
 for permission which was granted and he searched. And we 
7 would submit it on that basis. 
8 THE COURT: Mr. Benge, what's the, where does the 
g officer get the right to ask the questions in the first 
place about where he's going, what he's doing? 
MR. BENGE: I think he's allowed to make 
conversation, and at first just to make conversation, and 
then when he gets an accurate response I think he can go 
further into it. 
MS. MORGAN: And, Your Honor, I guess I would 
1 5
 disagree with that. I think he had Mr. Taylor's paperwork 
16 in hand and I think that the totality of the circumstances--
17 I I think that the officer had a hunch and obviously it was a 
good hunch but a hunch isn't good enough. I mean, we've got 
a black man in a red car, brand new car, with a West Indies 
accent. And I guess it's our position that that's what lead 
to this line of questioning in the first place. And that's 
what made his story about computers less plausible than 
maybe someone else's story. That he went beyond the scope 
when he started asking those questions. 
2 4
 II THE COURT: Okay. 
25 MR. BENGE: And I guess I certainly, I don't want 
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to play a race card or even respond to a race card being 
played but were this a white person in an old white car 
would this thing be any different if the same totality of 
circumstances exited, and therefore, the same articulatable 
suspicion? And we would submit it. 
MS. MORGAN: Well, Your Honor, I apologize if it 
7 I  appears that I!ve been attempting to play the race card 
8 here. But in profile stops in search and seizure law race 
9 I is often an issue and it's often discussed and that's why I 
just wanted to make clear that it was our position that that 
was a definite possible factor in this matter. 
MR. BENGE: The evidence indicates otherwise, Your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, I think this case turns for me 
on the question of whether the officer can legitimately 
1 5
 start asking these questions. Because I think if he could 
16 these answers do, they are strange enough, and I think maybe 
17 strange is the only word I can use. That you wonder, I 
1 8 think reasonably suspect this guy is doing something else 
other than what he says he is and he's hiding it and it's 
probably something illegal. At least enough suspicion 
reasonably to ask. 
And the question I'm struggling with is whether 
they can actually ask the questions in the first place. And 
I don't know that I've ever settled down in what I think 
2 4
 about that and I don't know of any appellate opinions that 
25 give me much guidance on that subject. Are either of you 
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aware of any before we address that? 
MR. BENGE: I can't quote cases on it, Your Honor, 
but I guess I'd argue that an officer, I think he can ask 
anything. Now if the person doesn't want to answer, that's 
I guess their business too. But I think, I don't think that 
6
 there's a Court is telling an officer what he can talk to a 
7 person that he stops out on the interstate about. 
8 THE COURT: Well, they have said you can't ask for 
9 consent to search until you get reasonable suspicion. You 
can't expand the stop. And they've also said you can't 
expand the scope. And yet I think it's also, I'm having 
trouble with a notion that an officer can't make friendly 
conversation with a passenger that he's stopped, with a 
driver that he's stopped, either. 
I really haven't heard evidence on whether the 
1 5
 length of the stop was expanded by the conversation, neither 
16 of you really addressed that. And maybe that's the critical 
17 I factor that I need to decide as well. Well, I think I'd 
better read the cases again. Either of you have any cases 
you want to suggest to me that I need to read or just 
general principles that you've argued? 
MR. BENGE: I don't have anything right in front 
of me, Your Honor. I might find something by the end of the 
week. I don't know, what is your timeframe? 
THE COURT: Well, if I don't decide today it will 
be next Thursday before I get to it. 
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Chapman that addresses scope in general, but itfs my 
recollection that there have only been one or two Utah cases 
since then and they don't answer this question. And so I 
don't think that you will find a definitive answer and if 
you do it's something I missed because I did look so I think 
6
 you're going to be put in a position of having to wing it. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, let me think about it a 
8 little more before I wing it then. And I'll get you a 
9 decision within two weeks. Why don't we just schedule Mr. 
Taylor for an appearance before the Court on the 3 0th to 
hear my decision if it hasn't been rendered before then and 
to schedule a trial date if I've denied the motion. If I 
grant the motion I suppose I can go ahead and grant a motion 
to dismiss at the same time because you don't have a viable 
case without the evidence. 
1 5
 II MR. BENGE: Correct. Thank you. 
16 MS. MORGAN: Well, Your Honor, on the 30th I won't 
17 be available but if you would intend to dismiss the case 
1 8 maybe you would want Mr. Taylor to wait while I'm on 
vacation. And so--
THE COURT: I'll make a decision by the 30th one 
way or another without you needing to be here. If I deny it 
we'll have it. Let's put it on the calendar for July 7th 
but I promise you, Mr. Taylor, I'll make a decision before 
the 30th. 
2 4
 I MS. MORGAN: Thank you, Your Honor. 
25 (Proceedings concluded) 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
1 
2
 m 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
3 || ) ss 
Salt Lake County ) 
13 
14 
16 
19 
22 
23 
24 
25 
•20 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, Julie Lay, do hereby certify that the foregoing 
pages, numbered 1 through 20, contain a true and accurate 
6
 transcript of the electronically recorded proceedings and 
7 transcribed by me to the best of my ability from the tapes 
8 furnished to me 
9 DATED: September 15, 1999 
10 
11
 I / <&*£/ ,/7^~7 
/Julie Lay ' ' 
12 1  ' / 
I, Lanette Shindurling, Certified Shorthand Reporter, 
and Notary Public for the State of Utah, do hereby certify 
that the foregoing transcript prepared by Julie Lay was 
1 5
 transcribed under my supervision and direction. 
Wtft w' 17 Lane t t e ^ShinSurlTng 
1 8 My Commission E x p i r e s : 
2 0 / ^ % v iAR i^ ta^P u b , ,c T 
ii . JB*£2SJ\ IANETTESHINOORLING 
ii 1-1 « , « » » • i ^ W?** Bro^way, $te. 200 I 
z x
 II • VX^^^M MyCommlMtonExpras 8 
. f i l l * ft ort/v> " L \ S / ^ t'u yS, 2C03 
